



Thinking and working politically:

Reviewing the evidence on the integration of politics into development practice over the past decade

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Executive summary

This paper provides a critical review of the evidence on thinking and working politically (TWP) in development. Scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognised that development is a fundamentally political process, and there are concerted efforts underway to develop more politically-informed ways of thinking and working. However, while there are interesting and engaging case studies in the literature, these do not yet constitute a strong evidence base that shows these efforts can be clearly linked to improved development outcomes. Much of the evidence used so far to support more politically-informed approaches is anecdotal, does not meet the highest standards for a robust body of evidence, is not comparative (systematically or otherwise), and draws on a small number of self-selected, relatively well-known success stories written by programme insiders.

The paper discusses the most common factors mentioned in the TWP literature as part of the account for why politically-informed programmes are believed to have been able to succeed in areas where more conventional programming approaches may have fallen short. It then looks at the state of the evidence on TWP in three areas: political context, sector, and organisation. The aim is to show where research efforts have been targeted so far and to provide guidance on where to focus next. In the final section, the paper outlines some ways of testing the core assumptions of the TWP agenda more thoroughly, such as:

- Systematically comparing a broader range of programmes in different sectors and organisational contexts, to draw firmer lessons about how incorporating politics impacts programme implementation and outcomes in different situations.
- Using a wider range of research methods to evaluate and support findings, such as building in counterfactuals to demonstrate variations in results across different programme approaches.

In addition, future research could usefully focus on developing a more complete picture of the systemic bureaucratic and political obstacles to TWP in donor agencies, and potential strategies to overcome them.

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1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to review the evidence on 'thinking and working politically' (TWP) in development in order to inform discussions around what may constitute good practice and around future evidence needs. While there are other, shorter reviews on the integration of politics in development theory and practice (e.g. Dasandi et al 2016; Wild et al, 2017), the aim here is to provide a more comprehensive and systematic assessment of the knowledge base than has been offered so far. In part it uses the framework suggested by Dasandi et al (2016) in order to more systematically evaluate the current evidence base across three areas - political settlement, sector and organization - to see if different patterns emerge and if more fine-grained lessons for specific contexts can be found.

A number of major donors have seen a growth of interest in recent years in incorporating a closer understanding of and engagement with politics in the design and implementation of their programmes. There has been a notable increase in programme proposals that explicitly reference TWP and/or what are said to be similar ideas such as problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) or flexible and adaptive management within DFID and the Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFID's recent review of their efforts to integrate politics into programming highlighted the organisation's commitment and set out some steps for further integration (Piron et al, 2016). The focus on politics and power in the 2017 *World Development Report* (World Bank, 2017) and the introduction of applied political economy analysis in USAID missions since 2014 (Garber, 2014) suggest a growing interest in politically-informed programming in other donors.

Much has been written about how prevailing organisational cultures, incentives and structures in most development agencies, as well as political pressure from government ministries, continue to pose significant obstacles to the implementation of more politically savvy development work (Carothers and De Gramont 2013; Unsworth 2015; Yanguas and Hulme 2014). A strong evidence base that demonstrates clearly and robustly that TWP contributes to more effective development practice and, importantly, improved outcomes could help to help overcome some of these challenges; however, as has been argued elsewhere (Hudson & Marquette 2015), much of the evidence used so far to support more politically-informed approaches is anecdotal; does not meet standards for a robust body of evidence (see for example DFID 2014); is not comparative (systematically or otherwise); and draws on a small number of self-selected, relatively well-known success stories written by insiders¹ (see also Wild et al, 2015; Piron et al 2016; Dasandi et al, 2016). It is therefore not surprising that many senior donor staff and the politicians they report to have tended to be cautious about adopting what is still seen in some quarters as a risky and unproven approach (McCulloch, 2014).

The striking rise in discussions of politics and power in development policy circles in the last ten to fifteen years - and the past four to five years in particular² - is in part the culmination of long-standing frustration among practitioners that many development projects have not always achieved their intended impact, despite efforts to improve the technical quality of programmes.

1 By 'insiders' we mean individuals who are either closely involved in the design or implementation of the programme themselves, or in the on-going conversations around thinking and working politically.

2 Since November 2013, a group of senior officials from major donors, along with leading practitioners and researchers, have been working together as a 'thinking and working politically' community of practice with the aim to 'deepen the practice' on TWP, including developing critical insights on practical innovations, and to 'widen the circle', promoting awareness of TWP thinking and approaches among the wider development community. More on the TWP Community of Practice can be found at <https://twppcommunity.org>.

There is a growing consensus that the persistence of poor policy and dysfunctional institutions usually has less to do with a lack of knowledge or finance than with the actions of powerful actors, groups or collective movements who gain from existing arrangements and resist change (Leftwich 2011). As such, the difference between programmes that support successful developmental change and those that fall short is said to be a deep understanding of and proactive engagement with local political and power relations. The conventional approach to development programmes – where a linear theory of change is established at the outset, based on institutional best practice, with inputs delivered in accordance – often fails in the face of contextual variations and shifting political interests. Progress is, thus, often more likely to occur when development programmes are designed and implemented with greater consideration of, and the flexibility to adapt to, local political dynamics (Hogg and Leftwich 2008).

Scholars have advocated for greater flexibility, learning from failure and paying attention to political context in aid programmes since at least the 1960s (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013), while calls to adopt a more adaptive, locally-led approach also have a strong precedent in development theory, with a particular group of authors in the 1980s championing this philosophy (Therkildsen, 1988; Korten, 1980; Rondinelli 1983). In the later 1990s, several prominent donors moved to incorporate better understandings of local political contexts and dynamics into their policy-making and operations (Fisher and Marquette, 2016). Incorporating recipient voices and preferences into development policy-making and practice has also been an important part of the aid effectiveness agenda since the early 2000s (Fisher and Marquette, 2016).

While ‘thinking and working politically’ does not describe an entirely new set of ideas or methods, it is nevertheless clear that we are witnessing an unprecedented level of interest in engaging with power and politics in development organisations. This growing recognition of the centrality of politics to development has not amounted to a revolution in the way development practice is conceived and carried out – hence Carothers and De Gramont’s (2013) ‘almost revolution’ - but it nonetheless resembles a significant effort to avoid what are now widely regarded as the flaws and unhelpful consequences of the predominately apolitical stance that characterised a great deal of development work in the past (see, for example, Marquette 2004

Box 1: What is ‘thinking and working politically’?

The origin of the phrase ‘thinking and working politically’ is uncertain (Teskey 2017). The first formal academic reference seems to be in Leftwich (2011), but there are internal DFID notes going back at least to the early 2000s that reference the key ideas (see, for example, Pycroft 2010; Pycroft 2006).³

While there is no single agreed definition, framework or set of formal tools for TWP, the TWP Community of Practice sets out three core principles⁴ (TWP, 2013):

- Strong political analysis, insight and understanding
- A detailed appreciation of, and response to, the local context
- Flexibility and adaptability in program design and implementation.

3 Pycroft also refers to ‘acting politically’ to differentiate between activities with a specifically political objective and ‘working politically’, as described here. Carothers and de Gramont (2013) talk about ‘thinking and acting politically’. For whatever reason, this distinction – which is important – does not seem to have been picked up in the wider literature.

4 A number of similar approaches, frameworks, and communities of practice have emerged in recent years, each of which also captures some aspect of the turn to thinking and working more politically in development theory and practice. In addition to TWP, the most commonly cited are *problem-driven iterative adaptation* (PDIA) (Andrews et al., 2012); *doing*

Thinking politically is said to mean elevating the importance of understanding the formal and informal institutional contexts within which change and development occurs, as well as – increasingly – the role of leaders, ideas, norms values etc (Hudson and Leftwich 2014). It encourages external actors to consider the impact they have on the politics of recipient countries and to see themselves as political agents, rather than simply providers of funding and technical assistance. As such, while the imperative to think politically clearly applies at the design and implementation stage of programmes, it also forces donors to carefully consider whether to intervene at all in a given context, given the potential political consequences.

Working politically is said to be about tailoring and adapting development assistance to national and sub-national conditions. It focuses attention on the unintended consequences of inadequately designed projects, and sharpens the focus on local leaderships and their successes – and failures – in bringing about needed reforms. Development – no matter in which sector - entails engagement with political processes that are contingent to local power structures and likely to be fluid and contested (DLP 2018). This often involves iterative adaptation based on regular re-evaluation of tactics and strategies in response to (regularly updated) political analysis. It may also involve enlisting partners, building coalitions, and establishing working alliances amidst the interplay of diverse political interests (O'Keefe et al, 2014).

Carothers and De Gramont refer to 'politically smart development aid'. As they explain, 'For proponents of *more* political approaches, working politically is less about doing more things – entering more political areas, working on demand-side efforts – than about doing things *differently*. It is about recognizing that developmental change at every step, at every level, is an inherently political process. The key to more effective assistance is to conceive of aid interventions as integral parts of productive sociopolitical processes that produce positive developmental change. In other words, politics is an approach rather than a sector' (2013: 159-160, emphasis in original).

The synthesis of ten years of research by the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) highlights the centrality of politics: 'Development outcomes cannot be achieved by technical solutions alone. This means that actors – politicians, bureaucrats, civil society, donors and so on – need to be able to better understand the local context ('thinking politically') in order to support the processes that enable local actors to bring about sustainable developmental change ('working politically'). Working politically is sometimes misunderstood as being about direct engagement with political actors and organisations, perhaps even interfering with a sovereign state's politics, but it is more nuanced than that. It means supporting, brokering, facilitating and aiding the emergence and practices of reform leaderships, organisations, networks and coalitions' (DLP 2018: 24-25).

development differently (DDD) (Wild et al 2017); and *politically smart, locally-led development* (Booth & Unsworth 2014). It should be noted that none of these are formal operational models but are rather sets of principles and suggestions for how development programmes can be designed in a way that improves upon conventional approaches (Hadley & Tilley, 2017: 23). Practitioners who are unfamiliar with the background and literature might find this range of frameworks, tools and accompanying acronyms somewhat bewildering (Algozo & Hudson, 2016; Parks, 2016). While each emphasises different aspects of the broader agenda in support of more politically-informed programming, they are often thought of as complements rather than substitutes; however, it should be noted that it is entirely possible to work in a way that is flexible and adaptive but is still blind to politics. Despite this, there does seem to be, at least in theory, a shared commitment in each framework to understanding and analysing the role that power and politics play in how development change happens, and applying this knowledge in the design and delivery of aid programmes (ABT, 2017).

Piron et al (2016: 2) describe how DFID's '[p]olitically informed approaches improve development effectiveness through:

- The "what": political goals, using development assistance to shift how power is distributed in the economy and society. The two main elements are: aiming for long term transformation of institutions; and supporting locally-led change processes more likely to be sustainable and successful: locally-owned (i.e. with local salience) and locally-negotiated.
- The "how": politically-smart methods, with greater realism and feasibility. The three main elements are: understanding power and politics in a specific context in order to identify opportunities and barriers for change; influencing and stakeholder management skills; and proactive risk management'.

A report by Teskey and Tyrell (2017) claims that there are two key factors that underpin TWP. First, change is inherently political in that it involves the renegotiation of power and resources. Given that change creates winners and losers, there will always be people or groups who want to block reform and keep the status quo, and those who will welcome change because they stand to gain from it. As such, in order to be successful, development programmes need to understand and respond to the interests, motivations and incentives that drive the behavior of those who have a stake in the process.

Second, change is complex and often unpredictable. It is very hard to know with certainty how a given reform process will unfold at the outset because it will involve changes in behaviour, incentives and interactions. Many of these 'moving parts' are hidden or unclear at the design stage of programmes, and will also change as the programme moves along, meaning that the overall behaviour of the environment cannot be known in advance (Teskey & Tyrell 2017; Wild et al, 2017).

By now it should be clear that there is no one agreed definition of thinking and working politically in the literature. The authors referred to in this paper come from different disciplinary backgrounds⁵ and different experiences of practice, with varying interests and incentives of their own. All in all, the summary of three key principles of TWP by the TWP CoP (political analysis, responsiveness to local context, flexibility and adaptation), which represents the effort of eighteen people to come to some sort of consensus, appears to summarise most of the definitions out there.

Methodology

This paper is based on a desk review of secondary literature. Members of the TWP Community of Practice were asked to provide relevant case studies or other literature, which was supplemented by searching Google and Google Scholar using various combinations of relevant key words. The sample was limited to literature, and case studies in particular, that looks at development practice through a lens or framework where TWP is a central concern as part of the analysis, strategy, partnerships or design. It is not limited to a particular definition of TWP or focused only on a particular approach and takes authors who self-identify as writing about TWP (or, in some cases, adaptive management) at face value.

5 See the discussion in Hudson and Leftwich (2014) for an explanation of why disciplinary differences matter to the ways in which TWP debates and tools have evolved.

Due to time and budget constraints, it was not possible to search out case studies/examples that describe programmes that in fact do think and work politically but do not self-identify as 'TWP'. Of course, any number of examples of effective politically-informed development practice might be taking place under the radar of the development research and practice communities, and so our claims regarding the state of the evidence on TWP must be understood to refer to the available published (Anglophone) literature. There may also be cases where, for many possible reasons, politically informed practice is happening, and could fit the broad descriptive characteristics here without it being labelled as such; that work cannot unfortunately be captured here. This is an important limitation of the TWP evidence base itself, as we will see, and it is a limitation of this study as well. However, as the cumulative knowledge produced by TWP insiders is clearly influencing development practice, trying to understand the strength of this particular evidence base remains important.

From the sampling a database of available case studies was created, an abridged version of which is provided in the Annex. While the database provides most of the empirical material for this report, the paper also refers to more conceptual literature, as well as conversations that have taken place through blogs and online commentary. This remains important for trying to understand what is, as we will see, in many ways an ongoing conversation rather than a rigorous evidence exercise.

2. What does the evidence base tell us about thinking and working politically?

This section discusses the most common factors mentioned in the TWP literature as part of the account for why politically-informed programmes are believed to have been able to succeed in areas where more conventional programming approaches may have fallen short. However, while the examples that have been put forward here suggest signs of innovative development practice, there are methodological limitations in the literature, as well as gaps in terms of content, that limit the confidence we have in these findings and the strength of the claims made on the basis of them. In short, they do not constitute the kind of rigorous enough evidence base that is needed to support more ambitious causal and predictive claims about the role of TWP in securing better development outcomes (Hudson & Marquette 2014; Dasandi et al, 2016).

Summarising the findings of this review:

- With a few exceptions the case studies reviewed fall short of the high standards on transparency, validity, reliability and cogency that one would expect in a strong evidence base (DFID 2014).
- As Dasandi et al (2016) also found, the literature remains almost entirely made up of single programme case studies, with few attempts at comparison, written for the most part by programme insiders.
- There have been improvements in terms of transparency on methods since Dasandi et al (2016), most notably Denney (2016), Denney and Maclaren (2016), Hadley and Tilley (2017), Harris (2016) and Lucia et al (2017). However, even these rely largely on interviews and documentary analysis, or a form of action research,⁶ rather than methods more appropriate for establishing causal explanations, and approaches to triangulation are often unclear. As a result, in the case studies reviewed, it is often hard to discern a direct causal relationship between TWP and the outcomes that were said to have been achieved.
- Only one study in our sample (Booth 2014) discusses counterfactuals and very few discuss challenges faced in the programmes or areas that were unsuccessful. Notable exceptions include Denney and Maclaren (2016), Hadley and Tilley (2017) and Lucia et al (2017). That may be a result of the fact that many TWP case studies have been written by funders or other actors who have been involved in evaluating programmes as part of their implementation (Dasandi et al, 2016: 4). A more balanced approach would also look to highlight those areas where TWP has failed to achieve positive results, or to achieve the results that were intended. This would seem to be particularly relevant to thinking and working politically, which emphasises the need to test theories of change and adapt projects in light of some activities failing.

6 As Denney (2016: 13) puts it, by telling the story of reform processes as they happen, action research is designed to shed light on the 'bumps and murkiness' that characterise development programming in reality. It is strongly implied that this approach affords a more realistic and therefore more reliable and useful account of the processes involved in TWP than post-hoc research that tends to 'neaten and rationalize decisions and processes after the fact' (Denney 2016: 13). However, as both Denney (2016) and Harris (2016) concede, this method also suffers from the limitation of not being able to point to longer-term results in the way that post-hoc research can with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, both authors are frank about the lack of available counterfactual evidence they were able to draw on – i.e. being able to compare contrasting approaches to the same challenge and assessing their influence on results. See also caveats in O'Keefe et al (2014).

- Indeed, studies rarely focus on outcomes, instead focusing on the reform and/or programming process instead. Few studies discuss criteria for 'success' or how they are measured.
- All of this raises concerns about quality, which can often be ameliorated by taking publication in well-regarded, peer reviewed journals as a proxy for quality. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the case studies have been published in peer reviewed journals. While one might expect a healthy balance between organizational working papers and journal articles in such a practice-oriented area, the lack of journal articles is a concern, especially when combined with the other points raised here.
- Finally, as we will see, the programmes reviewed here – by and large – look very similar, regardless of the political context, sector or organisation. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether the patterns that begin to emerge from comparing cases genuinely reflect an emerging consensus or if, in fact, this reflects growing 'group think' among TWP insiders.

Having said all of this, it is important to review the literature that constitutes the evidence base on TWP because potentially important insights can still be discerned, and to identify priorities for future research. With this in mind, the next section looks at the emerging evidence on what recurring factors are believed to enable programmes that have been designed to think and work politically to produce better outcomes. Section 3 uses the framework developed in Dasandi et al (2016) to look at the evidence across political contexts, sectors and organizations to see if any patterns emerge. In both sections, consideration is also given to emerging evidence gaps.

2.1 Recurring factors in TWP programmes

Although TWP is not a formal method or operational model, the literature highlights a number of recurring factors that are said to contribute to the success of more politically-informed programmes. Booth and Unsworth's 2014 paper is one of the most highly cited and influential discussions on the effect of TWP on the implementation and outcomes of development programmes. They look at seven cases of donor-led interventions, all of which were shown to have resulted in some tangible, short- or medium-term benefits for poor people.⁷ Common success factors flagged by the authors as apparent across all the cases are:

- leaders were politically smart and were able to use that knowledge effectively;
- programme managers allowed local actors to take the lead;
- the programmes adopted an 'iterative problem solving, stepwise learning' process;
- programme staff brokered relationships with major interest groups;
- donors provided flexible and strategic funding;
- there was a long-term commitment by donors and high level of continuity in staffing; and
- there was a supportive environment in the donor agency.

Each of the factors listed above maps onto what are said to be corresponding weaknesses in more conventional programming approaches. For example, the imperative to be 'politically smart' contrasts with what is seen as the failings of 'politically blind' approaches to development. Similarly, the importance of local ownership is a response to problems that have been seen to emerge from development initiatives largely driven by external actors.

Every one of the case studies identified through sampling included a selection of the above factors in their explanation for the programme's success, albeit in different combinations and with differing emphasis. Given, as we will see, that these programmes cut across different political contexts, sectors and organisations, this raises a red flag: are these factors actually the most important elements of programme success to the exclusion of other aspects, or have these factors been identified because Booth and Unsworth's (2014) paper has been so influential that authors are now primed to look out for and emphasise the same features when evaluating programme success? In other words, does the literature suffer from 'confirmation bias', which means that it draws lessons only from cases that fit a pre-existing notion of what factors lead to more successful programme implementation and outcomes (Dasandi et al 2016: 6)?⁸

Despite this concern, it is useful to set out what the case studies suggest under each of these categories and to provide specific examples to illustrate each of them. A relatively new area that emerges in the literature as important is the need for innovative monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures, and this is included here as well. As this is a new area of research and

7 It is not clear from their study whether these were the kinds of benefits, and of a scale, for which the funding was originally allocated. We would like to thank one of our reviewers for this point.

8 One of our reviewers flagged that the extent to which these features may be objectively verified is another challenge. What defines a politically smart or a politically unsmart leader, for example?

practice there is little consensus so far as to the best way(s) of doing M&E in the context of TWP, and so our discussion and examples should be seen simply as illustrative of current practice rather than an endorsement of any particular methods or approaches.

Politically smart

Evidence suggests that external actors and their partners should have access to the best knowledge they can generate or access about local political dynamics. Being politically smart means having an in-depth understanding of country and sector context, including embedded structures, history, and local institutions (both formal and informal, including norms, values and ideas), relationships and actors (DLP 2018). In light of the complexity of the change processes at hand, this political knowledge ideally needs to be constantly renewed rather than limited to a one-off exercise at the start of the programme cycle (Booth & Unsworth, 2014). Political economy analysis (PEA) and associated tools and frameworks are the principal methods by which most donor agencies have tried to become better informed about politics and power in recent years –although powerful critiques have been levelled, as outlined in box 2 below.

While PEA is referenced in some shape or form in most TWP studies, there are also some examples in the literature where being politically smart is said to be less about the application of a formal analytical framework and more about a spontaneous adjustment of ways of working by experienced practitioners with in-depth contextual knowledge (Booth & Faustino 2014: 3; Booth et al 2016: 13). This suggests that being politically well-informed is only one side of being politically smart: the other consists of having staff with the right kind of skills and aptitudes to use political insight and awareness effectively. As such, a common point made in TWP literature and commentary is that particular individuals might be more suitable for engaging with politics in a development context than others. For example, individuals who operate well in the context of uncertain and ambiguous political processes and the dilemmas and trade-offs they may present. Being able to spot opportunities as they open up, to think on their feet, and to build relationships, are also characteristics often associated with individuals who operate well within TWP programmes (Menocal, 2014).⁹

The need for skilled and experienced staff who have ideally operated on the ground for long periods of time and can act as brokers and coalition builders is a theme that also runs through the example of ‘development entrepreneurship’ described by Faustino and Booth (2014). While they stress the importance of team composition, they emphasise that within any broader coalition there needs to be a small team of leaders driving the change. Drawing on examples of successful reform in the Philippines, they propose an approach that seeks to ensure that the impact of reforms spreads beyond initial project sites and that reforms will continue without additional donor support. The authors posit five distinguishing features of development entrepreneurship: (1) a ‘technically sound and politically possible’ approach to selecting reform objectives; (2) an iterative ‘learning by doing’ approach; (3) principles for selecting self-motivated partners; (4) donor organizations encouraging innovation through ‘intrapreneurship’; and (5) a set of practical programme management tools. Drawing on ‘snapshots’ of examples of successful reforms in different sectors in the Philippines, these examples are used to draw out the main lessons of development entrepreneurship. However, the discussion of the specific examples of reform success is relatively short, and as such the link between examples and the lessons derived is not always clear. Given that it is also based on the personal experience of one of the authors, though this is not necessarily clear in the paper, the overall approach that is recommended would be strengthened by more systematic testing across a wider range of

9 Other widely-cited discussions of these soft skills, such as in Menocal (2014), Green (2015) or Marquette (2014), are featured on blogs – commentary and no more than that. It would be interesting to better understand the influence, if any, that blogs and other commentary have had in this space, including whether it is affecting ‘real-time’ programme design.

cases. This is important to establish whether and how the role of development entrepreneurs (or another similar approach) improves programme outcomes and also to determine what possible unintended consequences there could be.

Box 2: Example from the evidence base

The Enabling State Programme (ESP) in Nepal was a 13-year, DFID-supported programme with a budget of £33m. It sought to address issues of weak governance and social and political exclusion that research had identified as underlying causes of conflict and poor development outcomes. A series of independent evaluations point to ESP having been a major player in helping to shift the 'rules of the game' in the direction of greater social and political inclusion, as well as achieving more specific, quantifiable results. Specific examples of ESP impact include piloting of single treasury accounts in 38 districts (now rolled out in all 75 districts); support for the Public Service Commission that contributed to modest but positive increases in appointments of women and other excluded groups; and provision of disaggregated data and other evidence to the National Planning Commission.

During the lifespan of the programme, the DFID office in Nepal took considerable effort to become involved in and informed about local politics. This involved a programme of analysis and research into the underlying causes of the conflict dynamics that were unfolding at the time, including the political, economic, gender and ethnic dimensions and the impact of DFID programming. This research helped to refocus the work of the ESP team away from good governance and towards the critical conflict issues. In addition to this research and analysis, the team was able to recruit a number of well-informed, well-networked elite Nepali staff, who were not only politically well-informed but also skilful in navigating a charged political environment and in seizing opportunities to advance programme objectives (Booth and Unsworth 2014).

Box 3: Critiques of political economy analysis in the literature

As noted above, while there is much more to TWP than formal analysis, political economy analysis (PEA) is the main tool through which many development agencies have tried to incorporate a closer understanding of power and politics into their operations. PEA looks at the underlying drivers of political behaviour in different contexts and the effects of those drivers on policy and development interventions. However, PEA's overall efficacy has often been hampered, certainly in its earlier incarnations, by the methodology used and the nature of the approach taken (Fisher and Marquette 2014).

The evolution of PEA since the early 2000s has seen a move away from country-level studies aimed at institutionalising 'political thinking' in donor agencies towards more ad hoc analyses directed at solving specific practical problems in particular development interventions (Fisher & Marquette 2014). As a result, rather than bringing about a profound transformation in how donor agencies approach development and poverty reduction by establishing 'political thinking' as a central principle, it has increasingly been used as a technical tool to inform programme planning. As the original ambition to cultivate development officials who can instinctively 'think politically' seemed to lose momentum, political economy analysis and training became

increasingly carried out by external consultants who produced long and complex documents that are frequently too sensitive to be distributed outside the commissioning agency. This

sensitivity meant that – in contradiction of prevailing donor rhetoric on ‘local ownership’ and ‘partnership’ – recipient governments and local actors have tended to be consciously excluded by donors from the PEA process, except as objects of external analysis (Fisher & Marquette, 2014).

An additional critique is that PEA is often carried out only at the start of programme cycles, rather than being refreshed continuously as projects develop and local political dynamics change. This is particularly problematic from the perspective of TWP, as project assumptions that are built on insights gained from a political analysis completed at the outset of a project are likely to be outdated if the political context around a given reform is uncertain and fluid (Cole et al, 2016; Booth et al, 2016).

These observations, combined with recent examples indicating the importance of local programme staff with informal political awareness and contacts (discussed in more detail immediately below), have led to the development of ‘lighter-touch’ tools for political analysis that can be used on a day-to-day basis to inform decision making. Hudson et al (2016), for example, put forward ‘Everyday Political Analysis (EPA)’ to help frontline development practitioners make quick, politically-informed decisions on a day-to-day basis. This involves posing simple questions about the set of interests at play in a given scenario, and the space and capacity available to effect change. A similar exercise is recommended in Kelsall (2016) in relation to using political settlements analysis (PSA) as a diagnostic tool for country programming. It is too soon to assess whether these tools have contributed to any improvements on the ground, but the hope is that they can capture something of the original aim of PEA, providing officials with a better understanding of the overarching political dynamics of the sectors and countries they are working in while avoiding some of the more introspective tendencies of earlier generations of PEA work.

Given how many of the papers reviewed in our study reference tailored approaches to political analysis, now would be a good time to review changes in practice beyond the descriptions in published case studies. A recent paper by McCulloch et al (2017) provides a very readable guide to changes in the contexts in which development practitioners are now doing PEA, both in terms of the wider external context and the way in which aid is managed. The authors provide several recommendations for what aid practitioners should be doing differently when it comes to PEA, but these do not emerge out of the analysis, and there are few, if any, practical examples provided. However, the paper provides a good starting point for discussions around what ‘next generation’ PEA could (and, perhaps, should) look like.

Locally-led

The TWP literature places a strong emphasis on identifying issues that are important to local actors, and enabling them to play a leading role in the finding solutions and steering the programme approach, rather than introducing international best practice or addressing pre-determined issues (Donovan & Manuel, 2017; Hadley & Tilley 2017). The emphasis placed on local leadership is a way of underlining the significance of the knowledge, relationships, capacities and motives that can be brought to bear on a development problem by local actors, all of which is said to have an important role to play in creating interventions that have both impact and tractability (Booth & Unsworth, 2014). Otherwise, institutional reform programmes are believed to all too easily produce results characterised by what Andrews et al (2012) term ‘isomorphic mimicry’ – reforms and solutions that are designed to satisfy external funders but fail to change things in practice.

Box 4: Example from the evidence base

The Pacific Leadership Programme (PLP) was an Australian aid programme supporting leaders across the Pacific at the regional level and in four target countries: Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. It ran from 2008 to 2017 with a budget totalling nearly AUD 52 million. From 2014 onwards it narrowed its focus to supporting reform coalitions to undertake collective action for developmental change. Among other successes, the coalitions supported by the PLP achieved the passage of legislation in Vanuatu confirming temporary reserved seats for women at the municipal level; the development of a Tongan Leadership Code which was signed by 20,000 people; the start-up of new export industries in the Solomon Islands; and assisted with the emergence of national green growth coalitions in various Pacific countries.

According to a study on the programme by Denney and McLaren (2016), PLP was successful partly because it was open to testing new approaches to supporting locally-led change. For example, rather than putting out a request for proposals in pre-defined areas and getting potential partners to apply - thereby fitting with donor priorities and processes - PLP staff searched for local leaders and coalitions to lead on reforms. This meant allocating funding without calls for proposals (for a similar approach with FOSTER, see Lucia et al 2017: 5). PLP also adopted a strong partnership approach built around cooperative agreements. These supported local priorities and provided space for partners to lead their change processes, with PLP playing a role as a convener and 'critical friend'. Having locally-based staff with appropriate knowledge and contacts was critical for this kind of approach, alongside a willingness on the part of the programme staff to keep a low profile and work informally behind the scenes.

Iterative problem-solving

Rather than starting with a blueprint based on a solution mapped out in advance and a linear approach to delivery and results, the literature on TWP calls for implementing teams to search for the right approach to solve the problem at hand through a constant cycle of testing, learning, and adapting the programme approach. This kind of iteration means that the design and implementation of programmes occurs simultaneously (Cole et al 2016: 9). Project management therefore tends to involve an element of 'muddling through' but with continuous links to the problem and solution that are being worked towards (Hadley & Tilley 2017). This may involve making a series of 'small bets' on a range of solutions that might work, and responding quickly to lessons learned.

Box 5: Example from the evidence base

In 2012, DFAT and The Asia Foundation (TAF) began work under a strategic partnership agreement which included a range of reform initiatives that aimed to work politically in practice. In Bangladesh, the team worked with local partners to support efforts to move leather tanneries out of a dangerously polluted location to a modern industrial park. The goal was to improve compliance with health and environmental protection standards and potentially lead to growth in the sector. A reform coalition supported by TAF contributed significantly to expediting the relocation process, with figures issued in 2015 indicating that of the 155 tanneries allocated plots at the new estate, 148 had begun substantive construction.

As detailed in an ODI case study (Harris 2016), this initiative used structured learning to iterate and adapt over the course of implementation. This involved both regular reflective discussions as part of an approach called 'strategy testing' (Ladner 2015), along with day-to-day ad hoc adjustments. Strategy testing offered opportunities for discussion within the team across all

levels of seniority, and also prompted staff to regularly consider how changes in the reform context might affect their strategy. The team reported that the strategy testing sessions provided an opportunity for them to take stock of recent events and actions. It also offered an opportunity to update documentation to reflect changes in the programme and thereby provide a record of decision-making for donor accountability purposes (Harris 2016). Micro-adjustments were also made on an on-going basis through problem solving and informally reflecting on tactics, which was encouraged by the initiative's culture.

Brokering relationships

As we have seen in the discussion of the 'development entrepreneur' literature, TWP is said to require those providing support to act not simply as providers of funds or implementers, but also as facilitators and conveners – bringing together key stakeholders, supporting them in identifying problems and encouraging them to work collaboratively in finding potential solutions (Rocha Menocal & O'Neil, 2012; Rocha Menocal et al., 2008; Tavakoli et al., 2013). The literature suggests that strong networks and relationships - and the trust required to cement them - are often an important way of facilitating change in behaviours or policy (Faustino & Booth, 2014; Williamson, 2015).

Box 6: Example from the evidence base

The DFAT-funded Governance for Growth (GfG) programme has been supporting economic governance and public financial management (PFM) reforms in Vanuatu for the past decade. The programme has run over two phases at a cost of around AUD 90 million over the first nine years. GfG has been able to support reforms in a number of different areas. Flagship changes such as the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry have been accompanied by important reforms in areas such as wharf management, fiscal decentralisation, school capitation grants and taxation.

According to a review by Hadley and Tilley (2017), GfG has been able to support these reforms by working politically, a core part of which has involved building close relationships with senior and mid-level bureaucrats in government. Many features of GfG aim to encourage close working partnerships between the GfG team and their counterparts in Vanuatu, with an office co-located in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). In Vanuatu, there are factors which make this aspect of the initiative especially important. Individuals' relationships are shaped by local hierarchies and ties to family and place. Public institutions are often dominated by a particular island or church group with shared values, while status and kinship ties overlap with politics and public administration. This makes informal systems extremely important in the flow of knowledge, information and decisions (Cox et al., 2007). Building trust across groups and bridging these formal and informal systems is therefore central to supporting change in Vanuatu's public sector (Hadley & Tilley, 2017).¹⁰

10 A reviewer asked: how this is different from a donor funding a technical assistance team to establish an office close to government, and then developing a work plan based on negotiating priorities with the government and – with the donor's approval of the work plan – delivering this? We do not have the answer to this, but it could be an interesting question to explore in future research: in what ways, if any, is the experience of 'brokering relationships' in TWP programmes different both from (effective) technical assistance programmes and from the sort of relationship brokering done by foreign affairs staff?

Flexibility

Because development challenges typically involve a large number of moving and interlocking parts, desirable outcomes can be both hard to achieve and difficult to predict. Given this uncertainty, the TWP literature tends to recommend jettisoning the ‘blueprint’ project approach that has been said to have been conventional in development practice, with its assumptions that adopting good-practice institutions will promote development and that change can be effected by adherence to a pre-determined, tightly sequenced plan (Hadley and Tilley, 2017: 10). Instead, the TWP literature calls for a more flexible programme design that avoids prescribing targets in a rigid way or locking teams into working with particular institutions or organisations. In particular, flexible funding – i.e. the ability to adjust expenditure in response to strategic needs – is an important condition that allows programmes to work opportunistically and adaptively (Rocha Menocal, 2014).

Box 7: Example from the evidence base

The Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER) was a £14 million DFID-funded programme that focused on reforming the governance of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.¹¹ The first phase ran from 2011 to mid 2016. Some of its most notable results included recouping over £300 million of Nigerian public funds, influencing major legislation, and beginning to tackle the problem of illegal gas flaring (Booth, 2016: 5).

FOSTER’s approach and its contribution to the evidence on TWP have been documented in case studies produced by ODI (Bhalla et al, 2016) and the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) (Lucia et al, 2017). Both reports agree that the flexibility that was integrated into the design of the programme was a key element in some of its successes. Its ability to engage or disengage from organisations and individuals based on opportunities for reform was critical. For example, when a new head of the petroleum sector regulator was appointed, FOSTER provided limited support to organisational development. After nine months, it became clear the agency was not able to deliver more transparent allocation rounds. As a result, FOSTER’s support was quickly phased out and the programme refocused on working with the Nigerian parliament on legislative reform and building demand for reform outside of government.

The ability to react quickly was assisted by the way that flexibility was built into FOSTER’s funding structure, as the programme did not pre-allocate funds for any particular activity. Out of a total budget of £14 million, over £8.5 million was for a ‘managed fund’ setup. The rationale for this design was that it was not possible to know in advance the specific pathways through which change might occur. By having a flexibly managed fund, it was possible to identify and allocate resources to initiatives as the programme went along and as political dynamics changed (Lucia et al, 2017: 5).

¹¹ Out of a DFID-Nigeria annual budget that was £285m in 2017/18, for example.

Long-term commitment

In many of the documented cases of TWP programming, there has been a longer than usual commitment by the funder (by which we mean the programme ran for 6 years or more) which has often been accompanied by a relatively high level of continuity of donor and project-level staffing (Booth & Unsworth, 2014: 20-21). Longer-term commitments are believed to be necessary to allow donors to experiment and adapt, and also make it worthwhile for local leaders to invest their time and effort in participating (Unsworth, 2015: 60).

However, the majority of the programmes that have been written up as TWP case studies are still typical five-year development programmes. Some of these have since gone on to second phases, but that was not how they were originally designed. While it seems both intuitive and well-evidenced that political and social changes tend to happen over the longer term (with notable exceptions when there are, for example, shocks or other critical junctures), the TWP literature tends to argue for long-term commitment while still managing to claim successful outcomes in typical development programme time frames.

One exception is the study by Hadley and Tilley (2017) on the GfG programme in Vanuatu, which has the benefit of taking a longer-term approach by looking retrospectively at over a decade of programming experience. The paper traces the evolution of the initiative as described by key actors who were involved and provides an account of the wider political and cultural context for the programme. The authors take care to highlight factors in the GfG approach that are not central to pre-existing TWP literature so as not to 'simplistically reinforce a set of principles that are not universally endorsed' (Hadley & Tilley 2017: 25).¹²

Box 8: Example from the evidence base

ODI's Budget Strengthening Initiative (BSI) works in fragile and conflict-affected states to build more accountable and transparent budgets. Although its primary funding comes from DFID, the project works in collaboration with an international network of donors, including IMF and the World Bank. The first phase ran from 2010 to 2015 with a budget of £15.6 million. BSI has a strategic focus on the management of development resources as a whole, including budget and aid flows. Experiences from the initiative have been documented in a mid-term evaluation (Cox & Robson, 2013) and a synthesis report (Williamson, 2015). Notwithstanding some difficulties with assessing BSI's results against the indicators in its logframes (Cox and Robson, 2013: 3), it appears that the initiative has scored some notable successes. For example, in South Sudan, it has supported the establishment of a regular budgeting cycle, developed key instruments such as a National Budget Plan, and helped to introduce systems for expenditure limits and a regular cycle of budget reporting.

BSI aims to provide a mixture of short- and longer-term advisors, but the mid-term evaluation found that demand from counterparts was primarily for longer-term support rather than short, strategic inputs. Having continuity of advisors has helped build the relationships with counterparts that are a crucial part of delivering effective support. Those providing advice need

12 Hadley and Tilley (2017) provide an example of good practice in their comparison of the experience of GfG to a range of other examples from the TWP literature in order to highlight how different contexts, constraints and actors make different features of TWP more or less important. This aspect of their report provides a useful contrast to the tendency for TWP studies to focus on single programmes or country contexts. However, the programmes to which GfG are compared are virtually all funded and designed by one of two bilateral donors - DFID and DFAT. This is understandable given the way that the evidence is currently clustered - as we elaborate in the following section.

to sustain their engagement to ensure consistency in change processes and implementation support, learning with the team and supporting adaptation (Williamson, 2015: 46).

Supportive environment

An important precondition for all of the TWP factors mentioned above is said to be the existence of a supportive political and bureaucratic environment in the donor agency in question, which provides staff with sufficient room to innovate, experiment and seize opportunities. This kind of environment is said to require internal ‘champions’ within the donor organisation who can advocate for these approaches; close working relationships between the donor and implementing team; flexible and potentially longer-term funding and staffing arrangements; and a recognition that trajectories of change and programme results cannot always be predicted (Denney and McLaren, 2016: 31).

In some of the well-known TWP case studies, a supportive environment is said to have been achieved through funding modalities that enable implementing teams to work at arm’s length from the donor providing the bulk of the funding. This kind of approach is said to rest on a high level of trust between the funder and front line operators: the funding agency must show some willingness to let go and to refrain from detailed pre-programming. However, it has also been well-documented that some of the prevailing bureaucratic procedures and incentives within major aid agencies work against the effectiveness and uptake of politically-informed programming (Unsworth 2009; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Yanguas & Hulme, 2014; Hout, 2012).

Box 9: Example from the evidence base

The Pacific Leadership Programme (PLP) was implemented jointly by two AusAID staff who were co-located in the early phases with a team engaged by Cardno, a private contractor. According to Denney & McLaren (2016), this co-location arrangement helped create a supportive enabling environment for thinking and working politically by strengthening relationships between programme and donor staff and streamlining decision-making, approvals, communication and risk management. By having AusAID staff located within PLP, co-location made it possible for the program to take calculated risks and short circuit sign-off and communications procedures. By affording a degree of protection for PLP staff from the regular reporting requirements of AusAID, co-location meant that the programme was sufficiently agile to respond to opportunities as they arose and was able to manage the risks in supporting reform processes that challenged the status quo. Co-location was discontinued in Phase 3 of the programme, and it appears that this has co-incided with a slowdown in PLP’s communications and decision-making, along with challenges in building an awareness of what PLP does within DFAT (Denney and McLaren 2016: 4).

Monitoring and evaluation

A growing area of concern in the literature is the need to consider new approaches to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) that allow programme staff to better think and work politically. Traditional M&E methods are said to be designed to track progress in linear pre-planned projects, which are premised on both the result and the pathway to it being known from the outset. These kinds of methods are seen as less suitable for programmes where results emerge over time in the course of implementation, and where there is a need to track changes in programme strategy and action (Hudson & Marquette 2015). A key part of the rationale behind many TWP cases is a recognition that the context surrounding programmes may change quickly and in unpredictable ways, and that the complexity of development processes means that actors rarely know from the outset exactly how a given outcome can be achieved. This has led to calls to develop 'real-time' feedback loops that can provide the kind of dynamic information needed for programme adjustment and adaptation, while still satisfying donor demands for accountability (Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcock, 2012). The literature is beginning to explore different ways in which logframes and other planning and evaluation frameworks have been adapted to service this need.

Box 10. Examples from the evidence base

- As noted above, TAF in partnership with DFAT has developed an approach called Strategy Testing to track programmes addressing complex development problems through a highly iterative, adaptive 'searching' approach (Ladner, 2016).
- An example template for an adaptive logframe is provided in Wild et al (2017: 33). It sets out a set of clear objectives at the outcome level and focuses monitoring of outputs on the quality of the agreed rapid-cycle learning process.
- Continuous learning and regular monitoring were the foundations of the approach taken by DFID's Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER) programme. LASER had an overarching programme logframe, with 'nested logframes' for specific country interventions, designed to enable flexibility and easy adaptation (Derbyshire and Donovan, 2016).
- In Nigeria, the FOSTER II logframe holds the supplier accountable to achieve improvements in any of twelve areas of natural resource management, without limiting flexibility by specifying areas for engagement (Callaghan & Plank, 2017).
- The logframe used by the DFID-funded Centre for Inclusive Growth (CIG) in Nepal sets the programme's level of ambition by stipulating the number of projects to be identified and agreed at input level, without specifying the nature of these projects (Callaghan & Plank, 2017). This 'portfolio' or 'basket' approach has also been used by the Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) programme in Ghana and Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR) programme (Callaghan & Plank, 2017).
- DFID and USAID have recently issued the contract for a programme called Global Learning for Adaptive Management (GLAM). While it remains to be seen how much of GLAM's work will look at political factors, and how much will focus on largely technical programme management issues, it has promise with regard to learning and evidence, especially if the programme can produce evidence that clearly demonstrates a causal link between adaptive management (politically-informed or otherwise) and improved programme outcomes.

2.2 Different contexts in TWP case studies

Dasandi et al (2016) suggest that in order to develop the evidence base for what does and does not work in designing and implementing TWP programmes, researchers need to draw on and compare a broader set of programmes across a range of political contexts, sectors and organisational contexts. The literature at present does not allow for a clear understanding of how different contexts, sectors and organisations make the recurring features of TWP more or less important. For example, if brokering relationships with key political and bureaucratic actors is important, does the way in which this is done differ in a context like Nigeria, with a population of around 186 million people, as opposed to Vanuatu, with its population of just over 270,000? How does the way in which the Budget Strengthening Initiative operated in South Sudan – one of the poorest countries in the world, trying to build a state from scratch following conflict – compare to the way Coalitions for Change operated in the Philippines – a lower-middle-income country with a well-established (if quite dysfunctional) bureaucracy?

It is likely that different combinations of the recurring factors identified in the TWP literature will be required to unlock progress in different contexts and sectors (Hudson & Marquette, 2014: 74). For example, it is likely to be the case that successfully incorporating politics into programme design and implementation in the justice and security sector in a fragile and conflict-affected state means something quite different than in, say, a sanitation programme in a relatively stable country. One of our initial aims in compiling a database of TWP case studies was to identify patterns in the success factors across programmes in different country contexts, sectors, and organisations. We found, however, that due to some of the limitations around methodology described earlier, the current literature offers little in the way of guidance on how and why different aspects of TWP may be necessary and sufficient conditions for success in different scenarios, nor any discussion of whether and how some factors or approaches may be inappropriate in certain contexts. This section provides some guidance on where future research efforts could focus in selecting new programmes to study, by highlighting how the documented examples of TWP are currently clustered in terms of the following three key areas:

- The wider **political context** of development interventions – how does the prevailing political settlement in a given country affect development programmes?
- The **sectoral level** – how do the characteristics of specific sectors influence programme implementation and impact?
- The **organisational level** – how do features of the funding or implementing organisation support or hinder politically-informed programming?

The discussion below highlights the following key points about the current clustering of the evidence:

- The existing case studies on TWP programmes are significantly weighted towards countries with what we characterise below as **hybrid political settlements** – where there is a significant degree of elite inclusion and political contestation is largely peaceful, but some elites are excluded and actors may be willing to use political violence. Future research should look to draw on a wider range of country contexts, including countries that are fragile and conflict-affected, and should consider the impact (if any) of that political context on both the process and outcomes.

- There is a **wide breadth** of TWP studies spread across a range of sectors but very little depth. Most case studies are still in the governance sector and almost all of the others are about reform processes. Strengthening the evidence base for what works and why requires **greater depth**, through – for example - focusing on a number of different programming approaches in the same sector. There are also some key sectoral gaps that could usefully be explored.
- The evidence base on TWP programmes is predominantly focused on the role of bilateral and multilateral donors. Strengthening the evidence for TWP will require researchers to look at a **wider range of agents engaged in programming**, including implementing organisations. Importantly, greater effort should be made to explore national level development programmes and reform processes – including domestic advocacy and campaigning, as well as more formal reform processes - to better understand which features of TWP are specific to external actors and which are more general.

Table 1: Content gaps in the TWP evidence base

Category	Gaps
Context	Developmental states; fragile and conflict-affected states.
Sector / Issue	Gender; anti-corruption; climate and environmental governance; sanitation; social protection; humanitarian assistance; post-disaster reconstruction; education.
Organisation	Non-donors, including domestic or international NGOs; private sector implementers; domestic government agencies.

Political context

There are various ways of distinguishing and analysing the political context in which development interventions take place, including by reference to the political regime, the nature of political and bureaucratic leadership and interaction, or power structures such as gender, religion, ethnicity, caste and rural-urban divides. Here, we focus on the political settlement in a country as the key factor for identifying the different political contexts in which TWP programmes have been carried out. Political settlements analysis focuses on the power and incentives that shape the actions of key decision makers. It can enable development practitioners to distinguish meaningfully between different country contexts by identifying the kinds of issue areas, programming approaches, and potential partners with whom they are likely to have traction (Kelsall, 2016).

A broad working definition views political settlements as ‘informal and formal processes, agreements, and practices in a society that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power’ (Laws & Leftwich 2014: 1). A number of different typologies have been put forward in the literature to identify different types of political settlement. Synthesising a range of approaches, Kelsall (2016) identifies three particularly common forms: (i) developmental (ii) predatory and (iii) hybrid. While these are ideal types, they identify a broad range of features that enable states

to be categorised according to settlement type. These types are based on three features of the underlying power balance:

- The degree of *inclusivity*, i.e. the degree to which elites accept the prevailing balance of power and the accompanying distribution of rents and resources;
- The degree to which elites are *co-ordinated*, i.e. whether elites are motivated by a common purpose or national vision that unites them, or whether access to short-term spoils keeps elites within the settlement; and
- The kind of norms that govern the *political bureaucracy*, i.e. whether they are based on impersonal and meritocratic rules, or whether patronage and nepotism are key.

Developmental states are characterised by an inclusive settlement, a high degree of coordination amongst elites and a bureaucracy that operates on largely impersonal norms.

Predatory settlements tend to have exclusive settlements, spoils-driven elites and a bureaucracy with pervasive patron-client relations. **Hybrid settlements** sit between the two; there is a significant degree of inclusion and political contestation is for the most part peaceful, but some elites are excluded and actors may be willing to use political violence. Similarly, some elites are coordinated while others are spoils-driven, and the norms within the bureaucracy vary between elements of patronage and high-functioning ‘pockets’ that are largely rule-based (Wales et al, 2016: 13).

An implication of the political settlements approach is that successful development practice involves adaptation to the formal and informal processes, practices and agreements that constitute the underlying balance of power in a country. We would therefore expect that programmes designed and implemented successfully would need to be cognisant of and responsive to the prevailing political settlement in the country in question. For example, in highly exclusive settlements where political power is structured to keep out influences external to the government, working politically in an effective way might call for a particular emphasis on locally-led reform programmes that draw together programme staff and networks with strong political relationships and the ability to leverage those relationships in order to influence policy (Denney, 2016).

The existing case studies on TWP programmes are heavily weighted towards countries with hybrid political settlements. This is perhaps to be expected, given that, as Kelsall points out (2016), most countries in the developing world will have settlements of this kind, rather than exhibiting the characteristics at the other ends of the settlement spectrum (developmental or predatory). With the exception of a report on the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) in Rwanda (AGI, n.d.) there are no studies looking at how TWP programmes have operated in political contexts characterised by a ruling coalition that is strongly oriented towards developmental goals. Given that inclusive, co-ordinated, developmental states are highly rare in the developing world, this is also not necessarily an unexpected finding.

Predatory, exclusive, spoils-driven settlements are the second most common context in which TWP programmes have been studied. Trying to think and work in more politically engaged, experimental or entrepreneurial ways might be particularly appropriate for interventions in these kinds of challenging political contexts, given the uncertain change processes at play and the lack of prior accumulated evidence on what works (Wild et al, 2017). However, predatory settlements do not necessarily overlap with fragile or conflict-affected states, and a closer look at the spread of the evidence indicates a notable gap here in terms of TWP case studies. Of the 44 programmes that we identified as being the subject of TWP research, only seven are based exclusively in countries that are featured on the World Bank’s most recent Harmonised List of Fragile Situations. Given the growing concentration of aid from major donors, including DFID and the World Bank, in fragile and conflict-affected states, a greater emphasis of TWP research

efforts in violent and unstable political contexts would seem to be of particular importance given the untested nature of these ways of working.

Figure 1: Case studies grouped according to political settlement type




Table 2: Case studies grouped according to political settlement type

Type of settlement	Case studies and country
Predatory	State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) (Nigeria); FOSTER (Nigeria); State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) (Nigeria); Voices for Change (Nigeria); Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in DRC (DRC); Private Sector Development (DRC); Coalitions for Change (Philippines); Community Dispute Resolution (Philippines); Strengthening Local Service Delivery (Philippines); Empowerment, Voice and Accountability for Better Health and Nutrition (EVA) (Pakistan); Shifting Incentives in the Power Sector (Dominican Republic); Pay and Attendance Monitoring (Sierra Leone); Strategy and Policy Unit (Sierra Leone); Infrastructure Reform (Sierra Leone).
Developmental	Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) (Rwanda)
Hybrid	Local government development programmes (Uganda); Developing commercial agriculture (Ghana); Governance for Growth (Vanuatu); Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Programme (India); Leather sector initiative (Bangladesh); Enabling State (Nepal); Centre for Inclusive Growth (Nepal); Community dispute resolution (Nepal); Community policing (Sri Lanka); Community dispute resolution (Sri Lanka); Australia-Timor Leste Partnership for Human Development (Timor-Leste); Community policing (Timor-Leste); Governance for Development (Timor-Leste); Papua New Guinea Governance Facility (PNG); Local infrastructure (PNG); World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (Mongolia); Pyoe Pin (Myanmar); Rural Water and Accountability Programme (Tanzania); Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) (Indonesia); Governance for Growth (KOMPAK) (Indonesia); Reforming Solid Waste Management (Cambodia); Energy Subsidy Reform (Morocco); Infrastructure Reform (Zambia)
Multi-country	Budget Strengthening Initiative (South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, as well as with the Secretariat of the g7+, based in Timor-Leste); Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER) (Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Uganda, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Tanzania); Quality Improvement in the Health Sector (Ghana, Ethiopia); Pacific Leadership Program (Pacific region as a whole, with a focus on Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu); EU's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (Asia, Africa, Central and South America); Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development (Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Tonga)

Sector

In combination with the political context, it is likely that the conditions for successful TWP programme implementation will also vary considerably depending on the sector in question. This is because different sectors have particular characteristics that determine their political salience, the incentives for politicians to deliver them, the main actors and interests surrounding them, and the ways that citizens can mobilise around them. In particular, the

extent to which a particular sector or service is targetable, 'visible', measurable and easily credited, affects the likelihood that states will be responsive to efforts to reform it (Mcloughlin and Batley, 2012). For example, a state may have strong incentives for inclusive provision where a particular service or good has historically been a key source of state legitimacy and an expression of the social contract (Mcloughlin and Batley, 2012). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that programmes successfully designed and implemented with a close consideration of political dynamics would need to be aware of and responsive to the particular political characteristics of the sector in question.

TWP is associated closely with the governance sector, to the extent that some authors suggest that it might be trapped in a 'governance-ghetto' (Green, 2017; see also Yanguas & Hulme 2014). Our analysis of the evidence confirms that governance is the most heavily studied sector in the TWP field by a considerable measure, but the overall picture shows that individual studies are also spread across a very wide range of other sectors: justice and security, conflict resolution, infrastructure, gender equality, reform coalitions, public financial management (PFM), investment, health, community policing, rural livelihoods, economic development, legislative reform, private sector development, state capacity, human development, water, human resources, knowledge sector, solid waste management, forestry, agriculture, and service delivery. This supports the argument made by Menocal (2014) that TWP is not simply a governance solution to be applied to a narrow set of institutional issues, because incentives and power dynamics lie at the centre of most development challenges. TWP suggests principles for improving the delivery of any aid programme that involves reform and behavioural change – and therefore it should be as relevant in principle to the better delivery of health services or economic policy reform as it is to human development or water services.

However, while the breadth of individual TWP studies across a wide range of sectors is encouraging, particularly for actors hoping that TWP may offer a way of achieving improved progress on a diverse set of development challenges, strengthening the evidence base now requires greater depth in terms of sectoral focus. According to our review of the literature, governance, justice and security, and infrastructure are the only sectors that have been the subject of three or more case studies for politically-informed programming. It is not possible to draw robust conclusions about how development programmes can think and work politically in an effective way in a particular sector without a deeper and stronger evidence base to draw upon. This requires funding studies that look at a number of different programming approaches in the same sector, as well as studies looking at similar kinds of programmes in different sectors (Dasandi et al 2016). To the best of our knowledge, some key sectors that are missing altogether from the current TWP literature include: anti-corruption, climate and environmental governance, sanitation, social protection, humanitarian assistance, post-disaster reconstruction, and education.¹³

There are some wider issues for which the lack of depth of TWP research is particularly surprising. For example, it has been remarked upon by several authors that there is a lack of focus on issues related to gender equality in TWP literature (Browne, 2014; Koester, 2015; Dasandi et al, 2016; Laws et al, 2018).¹⁴ This omission is glaring given that gender is one of most central and pervasive systems that shape power relations in the world. Incorporating gender would therefore seem to be an important part of being politically smart in the context of most analyses, sectors and programmes (Koester, 2015).

13 The analytical framework developed in the 2018 World Development Report, for example, acknowledges that the factors that hold back progress in education in developing countries are both technical and political.

14 A recently published research stream from DLP, consisting of a literature review, synthesis report and a series of case studies, looks at how external actors can combine gender analysis with TWP to achieve more effective development outcomes. Unfortunately, it was published too late to be incorporated in this paper, but it can be found at <http://www.dlprog.org/gender-and-politics-in-practice.php>.

There are at least two different ways of considering gender-related issues through a TWP lens: (a) purposefully attempting to apply TWP principles in tackling gender inequality through a targeted programme; (b) understanding gender as a critical aspect of power to be considered during analysis and programming, regardless of whether the overall objective is framed explicitly around gender goals. In terms of the former, our review of the evidence base found only two examples of programmes designed directly to address gender issues through TWP. As for the latter, other commentaries have noted a more general ‘gender-blindness’ in common tools and frameworks for political analysis in development, including PEA (Browne, 2014; Koester, 2016). This is because they often start by looking at who has access to power and their incentives: the political and economic elite, usually men in capital cities (Piron et al, 2016: 34). By addressing this blindspot, it is claimed that a focus on gender can significantly enhance donors’ insights into power dynamics and their ability to think and work politically (Koester, 2016).

Figure 2: Case studies grouped according to sector




Table 3: Case studies grouped according to sector

Sector/issue area	Case studies
Governance	State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) (Nigeria); FOSTER (Nigeria); State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) (Nigeria); Enabling State (Nepal); Governance for Development (Timor Lesete); PNG Governance Facility (PNG); Strategy and Policy Unit (Sierra Leone); Governance for Growth (KOMPAK) (Indonesia); Pyoe Pin (Myanmar)
Justice and security	Community Dispute Resolution (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nepal); Community Policing (Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste)
Infrastructure	Local government development programmes (Uganda); Local Infrastructure (PNG); Infrastructure Reform (Sierra Leone); Infrastructure Reform (Zambia);
Conflict resolution	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in DRC (DRC)
Gender equality	Voices for Change (V4C) (Nigeria); Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development (Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Tonga)
Reform coalitions	Coalitions for Change (Philippines); Pacific Leadership Program (Pacific region)
PFM	Governance for Growth (Vanuatu); Budget Strengthening Initiative (South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, Timor-Leste).
Investment	Centre for Inclusive Growth (Nepal); Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER) (Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somaliland Uganda, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Tanzania)
Health	Empowerment, Voice and Accountability for Better Health and Nutrition (EVA) (Pakistan); Quality Improvement in the Health Sector (Ghana, Ethiopia)
Energy	Shifting Incentives in the Power Sector (Dominican Republic); Energy Subsidy Reform (Morocco)
Rural Livelihoods	Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Programme (India)
Economic development	Leather Sector Initiative (Bangladesh); World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (Mongolia)
Private sector development	Private Sector Development (DRC)

Sector/issue area	Case studies
State capacity	Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) (Rwanda)
Human development	Australia-Timor Leste Partnership for Human Development (ATLPHD) (Timor Leste)
Water	Rural Water and Accountability Programme (Tanzania)
Human resources	Pay and Attendance Monitoring Programme (Sierra Leone)
Knowledge sector	Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) (Indonesia)
Solid waste management	Reforming Solid Waste Management, (Cambodia)
Forestry	EU's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan
Agriculture	Developing Commercial Agriculture (Ghana)
Service delivery	Strengthening Local Service Delivery (Philippines)

Organisation

The third level of analysis focuses on the organisations involved in the design and implementation of TWP programmes. The organisations involved in programmes include external actors (the bilateral or multilateral donors or international NGOs (INGOs) which are usually responsible for funding and programme design) and domestic partners (the government agencies and local NGOs which are typically responsible for programme implementation and aspects of design) (Dasandi et al 2016: 11).

Certain kinds of organisational characteristics are closely associated in the literature with successful thinking and working politically. For example, as we have seen in the previous section, the TWP literature calls for organisations – and individuals within those organisations – that can solve problems and search for workable solutions through iterative learning, can broker relationships with key stakeholders in a specific programme area, and are prepared to experiment with flexible and strategic funding modalities (Dasandi et al 2016; Booth & Unsworth 2014). It is argued that ideally, organisations need to have processes in place that encourage this kind of experimentation, innovation and learning, along with a bureaucratic and managerial culture that supports staff in operating along these lines (Bain et al, 2016: 35).

The literature on TWP programmes is focused primarily on the role of bilateral and multilateral donors. For the most part, the agencies in question are DFID, DFAT, and the World Bank. Given that these donors fund a significant amount of the research that constitutes the TWP literature, this bias is not surprising, but strengthening the evidence for TWP will require researchers to look at a wider range of agents engaged in programming (Dasandi et al, 2016). In particular, there is a lack of research looking at the demands that TWP places on the internal systems,


capabilities and incentive structures of the organisations actually implementing programmes on the ground – whether domestic or international NGOs, commercial service providers or domestic government agencies. The small number of documented cases that do focus on the experience of the implementing organisation mostly centre on one particular INGO, TAF, some of which were produced in collaboration with ODI (Faustino and Booth, 2014; Denney, 2016; Valters, 2016; Harris 2016). Excluding one report looking at the work of Peace Direct and Centre Résolution Conflits in the DRC (Gillhespy and Hayman 2011), there appear to be no TWP studies that focus on cases where an INGO is the external funding organisation and a local NGO is the implementing partner. There are no cases at all in the sampled literature that look specifically at the experience of domestic government agencies in implementing TWP programmes with external donor support. Finally, the strong emphasis in the TWP literature on donor-led reform programmes has meant that little attention has been paid to how to work politically on development challenges through non-aid channels such as international policy processes (Piron et al 2016: 37).

A more detailed insight into the internal processes involved in TWP in donor agencies is put forward in a collection of essays in Fritz et al (2014), which looks at the implementation of PEA in eight World Bank country programmes. These studies demonstrate how the findings and recommendations from political analysis were taken on board by different programmes and used in operational practice. As such, they provide an insight into some of the micro-level processes involved in TWP within the donor organisation and country teams. However, these studies are weaker on demonstrating how the implementation of the insights from PEA led to better outcomes or more successful programming decisions.

There are still development organisations that do not undertake political analysis at all, relying on purely technical feasibility analysis for their projects (McCulloch et al, 2017). Even development agencies such as DFID that have been pioneering the adoption of political analysis tools report that the implementation of those tools has not strongly influenced practice (Piron et al, 2016). More than a decade after the widespread introduction of PEA, most donor agencies continue to be informed by a technical understanding of the development enterprise which focuses on the process of implementing projects and programmes without regard for the political context (Hout, 2012: 407-408; Fisher & Marquette 2016: 116).

In recent years, donor officials in most Western countries have been increasingly pressured to demonstrate that aid provision is effective in delivering results and providing value-for-money for the taxpayers who finance it, particularly in light of reductions in public spending (Scott et al, 2012). But the unintended consequences of the management and reporting systems that several prominent donors – including USAID (Natsios, 2010), the World Bank (Bain et al, 2016), and DFID (Valters & Whitty, 2017) – have created to prove their value to skeptical publics and parliaments are problematic from the perspective of encouraging more politically-informed programming. This is because those systems tend to rely on the identification and achievement of pre-determined, fixed targets. This ‘blueprint’ approach to programme design and evaluation, in which the expected causal pathways from inputs to desired outcomes are mapped out in detail at the outset, is difficult to square with the more flexible, long-term, and locally-led approach to change that is emphasised in TWP literature, given that the intermediate results of these kinds of approaches are not easy to map out in advance (Valters & Whitty, 2017; Hout 2012: 408). Programmes that are explicitly designed at the outset to be flexible and adaptive such as DFID’s FOSTER have apparently found it hard to reconcile the reporting requirements of the logframe with the need to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground (Piron et al, 2016: 38).

Figure 3: Case studies grouped according to organisation



Organisation in focus

Type of organisation	Organisation, case studies, country
Bi-lateral donor	<p>DFID: State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) (Nigeria); FOSTER (Nigeria); State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) (Nigeria); Voices for Change (V4C) (Nigeria); Private Sector Development (DRC); Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Programme (India); Enabling State Programme (Nepal); Centre for Inclusive Growth (Nepal); Empowerment, Voice and Accountability for Better Health and Nutrition (EVA) (Pakistan); Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER) (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Bangladesh, Burma and Tanzania).</p> <p>DFAT: Governance for Growth (Vanuatu); Australia-Timor Leste Partnership for Human Development (ATLPHD) (Timor-Leste); KOMPAK (Indonesia); Pacific Leadership Program (Pacific region); Governance for Development (Timor-Leste); Papua New Guinea Governance Facility (PNG); Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development (Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Tonga).</p>

Type of organisation	Organisation, case studies, country
Multi-lateral donor	<p>World Bank: Strengthening Local Service Delivery (Philippines); Developing commercial agriculture (Ghana); Local infrastructure (PNG); Shifting incentives in the power sector, (Dominican Republic); World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (Mongolia); Infrastructure reform (Sierra Leone); Energy subsidy reform (Morocco); Infrastructure reform (Zambia)</p> <p>UNDP & World Bank: Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) (Rwanda)</p> <p>EU: Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan</p> <p>UNCDF, World Bank: Local government development programmes (Uganda)</p>
INGO/NGO	<p>Peace Direct, Centre Résolution Conflicts: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DRC)</p> <p>TAF: Community Dispute Resolution (Philippines); Community Dispute Resolution (Sri Lanka); Community Policing (Timor-Leste); Community Policing (Sri Lanka)</p>
Donor/INGO	<p>USAID & DFAT/TAF: Coalitions for Change (Philippines)</p> <p>DFAT/TAF: Leather sector Initiative (Bangladesh); Reforming Solid Waste Management (Cambodia)</p>
Donor collaboration	<p>DFID, SIDA, & DANIDA: Pyoe Pin (Myanmar)</p> <p>DFID & SNV: Rural Water and Accountability Programme (Tanzania)</p>
Donor/international partnership	<p>DFID & the Global Fund: Pay and Attendance Monitoring Programme (Sierra Leone)</p>
Donor/private foundations	<p>UNDP, EU, DFID & Africa Governance Initiative (AGI): Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU), (Sierra Leone)</p>
Donor/government	<p>DFAT/Government of Indonesia: Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) (Indonesia)</p>
INGO/private foundation	<p>TAF/Hewlett Foundation, later USAID: Community Dispute Resolution (Nepal)</p>
Think-tank (with multi-donor funding)	<p>ODI: Budget Strengthening Initiative (South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, Timor-Leste)</p>

3. Challenges and ways forward on evidence

This paper has looked at the evidence base for TWP with the aim of providing guidance for future research into what works, where and why in terms of TWP programming. In short, we found that while there are certainly interesting and engaging case studies in the literature, these do not yet constitute a strong evidence base. Given the rising interest in developing more politically informed, flexible and adaptive programming, this should be an urgent concern for funders.

The analysis here suggests that future research should consider:

1. **More rigorous testing** of what works, where, why and how. Ideally, this would happen while this sort of programming is still relatively 'niche' and where it does not yet make up a significant percentage of donor funding. Developing a better understanding of the approaches and strategies that work well in different political, sectoral and organisational contexts will be an important step if TWP is going to move into more mainstream development programming.
2. Ensuring there are **higher standards for research/evidence** with more attention paid to things like sampling, transparency and so on. We also recommend using a wider range of research methods to evaluate and support findings, such as building in counterfactuals to demonstrate variations in results across different programme approaches, using triangulation, and undertaking longitudinal studies to establish whether initial results are sustained over time. Again, while we would not expect every TWP case study to be published in a peer reviewed journal (where there may be a limited market for the research anyway), a reasonable percentage should be able to withstand the rigours of academic peer review.
3. **Looking at programmes in a broader range of political contexts**, including programmes in states that are fragile and conflict-affected.
4. **Providing a deeper understanding of how programmes can think and work politically in specific sectors**. While there is an encouraging breadth of individual TWP studies across a wide range of sectors, strengthening the evidence base requires greater depth in terms of sectoral focus.
5. **Broadening the range of organisations that are looked at in the context of TWP**: The evidence is focused heavily on bilateral and multilateral donors; we know little about the demands that TWP places on implementing organisations, or how to apply insights from the TWP field to non-aid actors.
6. Systematically **comparing a broader range of programmes in different sectors and organisational contexts**, in order to draw firmer lessons about how incorporating politics impacts programme implementation and outcomes in different situations, and to test some of the common assumptions about what works. This will help to demonstrate whether there are general lessons about when, why, and how different factors identified in TWP literature lead to programme success or failure.

7. **Developing a more complete picture of the ways in which TWP faces a set of systemic bureaucratic and political obstacles.** From the available literature that looks at different organisational experiences of integrating politics into development programming, it is possible to identify a common overarching message: thinking politically is often easier to achieve than working politically. This point has been made in studies looking at TWP in bilateral donors (Unsworth, 2009; Piron, 2016; Wild et al, 2017; Booth et al, 2016), multilaterals (Hout, 2012; Bain et al, 2016), as well as the very limited literature on implementing organisations (Teskey & Tyrell, 2017: 3). For future research, an important step towards a clearer understanding of the constraints that can hinder more political ways of working would be to explore where and how these barriers have occurred in the context of specific strategies, programmes, or country offices. Comparative analysis could then be used to test assumptions and draw out lessons about how actors have or have not been able to navigate around them in different contexts.

8. Finally, research could **anticipate future evidence needs by scanning discussions and debates** in community of practice meetings and in blogs/commentary. These are likely to continue to influence practice in 'real time' in the absence of good evidence. This includes, for example, exploring donors' needs in terms of investment in people and skills, including creating the time for them to develop relationships with stakeholders, both internally and externally. Future research could usefully focus in more detail on the kinds of working relationships that donors need to establish with implementing partners and commercial service providers, in order to properly incentivise and reward them for taking a more political and adaptive approach. In particular, questions remain over the most suitable kinds of commissioning, contracting and payment arrangements. It could also include research on what TWP programming means in terms of staff time, where programming is said to be more labour-intensive than more traditional programmes, requiring attention to processes as much as results, and involving engagement and relationship-building with stakeholders for facilitation and coalition-building – all of which can come with an uncertain timeframe, low spend and high administrative cost (Derbyshire & Donovan, 2016).

4. Conclusion

Scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognised that development is a fundamentally political process. This review suggests that while there is concerted effort to better develop more politically-informed ways of thinking and working, there is limited evidence that these efforts can be clearly linked to improved development outcomes. To date, TWP (and its variations, such as adaptive management) still remain confined to a relatively small part of development agencies (Wild & Foresti, 2011). While there has been impressive progress in influencing the mainstream development narrative, more work is needed to avoid siloed thinking and to engage with a wider range of other actors. That may include audiences outside of the conventional aid world, particularly given the increasing involvement of foreign ministries and defense departments in the management of overseas development budgets in a number of major donor countries (TWP CoP, 2017).

Communities like the TWP Community of Practice (and others) have a valuable potential role in pushing the evidence agenda along and in providing a more critical function for improved learning and adaptation. Whether or not TWP will be taken up by a wider audience will rest partly on the strength of the evidence that it is associated with more effective programmes. While there is a growing body of examples and practitioner experience that indicates the value of TWP, there is a need for more systematic and comparative research and evidence in order to draw stronger conclusions, to justify recommendations and to avoid what may emerge as TWP's own unintended consequences.

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Program/Campaign	External organisation	Type of external organisation	Implementer	Country or region	Political settlement	Sector	Budget and contracting	Duration (years)
State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI)	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	Palladium (then GRM)	Nigeria	Predatory	Governance	£21m	8
Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER)	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	OPM	Nigeria	Predatory	Governance	£14 million, with £8.5 million allocated to a managed fund	8
State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC)	DFID	Bi-lateral donor		Nigeria	Predatory	Governance	£65.1m	8
Voices for change	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA); Itadi; Palladium; Social Development Direct	Nigeria	Predatory	Gender equality	£29m	5
Private sector development	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	The World Bank (EFO)	DRC	Predatory	Private sector development	£102,499,988	12
Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Programme	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	DD International (formerly NR International) led consortium	India	Hybrid	Rural livelihoods	£32.75m	10
The Enabling State Programme	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	BBC Media Action, CSC & CO, Dalit NGO Federation (DNF), Madhesh Community Mediation Project, NEFIN (Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities), UNDP GBP Contributions, WYG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED	Nepal	Hybrid	Governance	£33m	13
Centre for Inclusive Growth	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	ASI	Nepal	Hybrid	Investment	£12.8m	5
Empowerment, Voice and Accountability for Better Health and Nutrition (EVA)	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	Palladium in partnership with the Centre for Communications Programmes Pakistan.	Pakistan	Predatory	Health	£18.85m	5
The Legal Assistance for Economic Reform Programme (LASER)	DFID	Bi-lateral donor	KPMG & the Law and Development Partnership	Eight countries with a focus on fragile and conflict affected contexts Five in-depth: Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Uganda Three light touch: Bangladesh, Burma, Tanzania	Multi-country	Investment	\$4.3m	4
Pyoe Pin	DFID, SIDA, and Danida	Donor collaboration	British Council	Myanmar	Hybrid	Governance	Phase 1: £4m Phase 2: £12.8m	12
Rural water and accountability programme	DFID, SNV (Netherlands Development Organisation)	Donor collaboration	SNV	Tanzania	Water			2008-present
Pay and attendance monitoring programme	DFID and the Global Fund	Donor and international partnership organisation	Government of Sierra Leone with support from a consulting firm providing technical assistance	Sierra Leone	Predatory	Human resources	£13.5m over first 3 years	2010 -
EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan	EU w/DFID	Multilateral donor		Asia, Africa, Central and South America	Multi-country	Forestry		25 + years
Governance for growth in Vanuatu	DFAT	Bi-lateral donor	ABT	Vanuatu	Hybrid	PFM	AU\$86.4m	9
Australia-Timor Leste Partnership for Human Development (ATLPHD)	DFAT	Bi-lateral donor	ABT	Timor-Leste	Hybrid	Human Development	AU\$120m	From mid-2016 for 5 years
Governance for Development	DFAT	Bi-lateral donor	DFAT	Timor-Leste	Hybrid	Governance	AUS\$42.4m	8
Papua New Guinea Governance Facility	DFAT	Bi-lateral donor	ABT	PNG	Hybrid	Governance	Up to AU\$360m	4
Governance for Growth (KOMPAK)	DFAT	Bi-lateral donor	ABT	Indonesia	Hybrid	Governance	AUS \$81 million	3

Program/Campaign	External organisation	Type of external organisation	Implementer	Country or region	Political settlement	Sector	Budget and contracting	Duration (years)
Pacific Leadership Program (PLP)	DFAT	Bi-lateral donor		Pacific region as a whole, with a focus on Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.	Multi-country	Reform coalitions	AUD 52 million	9
Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI)	DFAT/Government of Indonesia	Donor/government collaboration		Indonesia	Hybrid	Knowledge sector		5
Coalitions for Change	DFAT-TAF	Donor/INGO	TAF	Philippines	Predatory	Reform coalitions	AUS \$45m	7
Leather sector initiative	DFAT/TAF	Donor/INGO		Bangladesh	Hybrid	Economic development	AUS\$675,000	3.5
Reforming solid waste management	DFAT/TAF	Donor/INGO		Cambodia	Hybrid	Solid waste management	US\$853,790	1 year and 11 months
Local government development programmes	DDP (UNCDF)	Multilateral donor	Government of Uganda with involvement from donors	Uganda	Hybrid	Infrastructure	DDP: US \$ 17.5m LGDP I: US\$80.9m	DDP: 1997-2001; LGDP I: 2000-2004
Budget Strengthening Initiative (BSI)	ODI (with funding from DFID, AusAID, Danida and the World Bank (through g7))	Think-tank with multiple sources of donor funding	ODI	South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, as well as with the Secretariat of the G7+, based in Timor-Leste	Multi-country	PFM	£15.6 million	5
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in DRC	Peace Direct	INGO	Centre Résolution Conflits	DRC	Predatory	Conflict resolution	US\$200m	3
Community dispute resolution	TAF	INGO		Philippines	Predatory	Justice and security		
Community dispute resolution	TAF	INGO		Sri Lanka	Hybrid	Justice and security		
Community policing	TAF	INGO	TAF	Timor-Leste	Hybrid	Justice and security	US\$5.65m	7
Community dispute resolution	TAF/Hewlett Foundation and later USAID	INGO/Private foundation		Nepal	Hybrid	Justice and security		2012-present
Community policing	TAF w/DFID & BHC funding	INGO	TAF	Sri Lanka	Hybrid	Justice and security	Approximately US\$ 3.4m funded by BHC from 2009 to 2015, and US\$ 1m funded by DFID from 2010 to 2015	6
Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI)	UNDP, World Bank	Multilateral donor	AGI/Government of Rwanda	Rwanda	Developmental	State capacity	US \$37m	4
Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU)	Various private foundations and institutional donors	Donor and private foundation collaboration	AGI	Sierra Leone	Predatory	Governance	Approximately £1.6m/year	2008-present
Strengthening Local Service Delivery in the Philippines	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Philippines	Predatory	Service delivery		
Developing commercial agriculture	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Ghana	Hybrid	Agriculture		
Local infrastructure in PNG	World Bank	Multilateral donor		PNG	Hybrid	Infrastructure		
Shifting incentives in the power sector	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Dominican Republic	Predatory	Energy		
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Mongolia	Hybrid	Economic development		
Infrastructure reform	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Sierra Leone	Predatory	Infrastructure		
Energy subsidy reform	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Morocco	Hybrid	Energy		
Infrastructure reform	World Bank	Multilateral donor		Zambia	Hybrid	Infrastructure		
Quality improvement in the health sector				Ghana, Ethiopia	Multi-country	Health		
Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development		Bi-lateral donor		Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Tonga	Multi-country	Gender equality		